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This special issue is the outcome of collaborative work on the relationship between language and
landscape, carried out in the Language and Cognition Group at the Max Planck Institute for Psy-
cholinguistics. The contributions explore the linguistic categories of landscape terms and place
names in nine genetically, typologically and geographically diverse languages, drawing on data from
ﬁrst-hand ﬁeldwork. The present introductory article lays out the reasons why the domain of land-
scape is of central interest to the language sciences and beyond, and it outlines some of the major
patterns that emerge from the cross-linguistic comparison which the papers invite. The data point
to considerable variation within and across languages in how systems of landscape terms and place
names are ontologised. This has important implications for practical applications from international
law to modern navigation systems.
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Many disciplines and specialist lines of research have been interested in human under-
standings of landscape, for example archaeology (Tilley, 1994), anthropology (Bender,
1993; Hirsch and O’Hanlon, 1995; Ellen and Fukui, 1996), psychology, philosophy and,
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icant interest to linguistics. But a moment’s reﬂection reveals a domain with wide ramiﬁ-
cations through the linguistic sciences: How are landscape features selected as nameable
objects (‘river’, ‘mountain’, ‘cliﬀ’)? Are there universal categories? What is the relation
between landscape terms (common nouns) and place names (proper nouns)? How trans-
latable are landscape terms across languages, and what ontological categories do they
commit to? Do they form structured sets of terms, semantic ﬁelds, with possible grammat-
ical reﬂexes?
In the ﬁrst part of the introduction to this special issue, we therefore lay out some of the
reasons why this proves to be a fascinating domain for linguists, while in the second part
we outline some of the interesting features that emerge from the cross-linguistic compar-
isons which the papers in this volume invite. We hope this collection of articles, which pre-
sents data from nine diverse languages, will play a pioneering role in establishing this topic
in sustained linguistic discussions.
2. Landscape: an important but unexplored area of linguistics
Landscape, or more generally ‘environment’, provides an interesting domain of human
categorisation and labelling for a number of reasons. First, just as everyone has a body
(see the special issue of this journal edited by Majid et al., 2006), every human inhabits
a landscape, even if the nature of that is highly variable. Just like the body, parts and cat-
egories rely on a segmentation of what is, from a topological point of view, largely a con-
tinuous surface – the division into parts is to a great extent imposed by our categories. In
both cases, too, there is a sense in which we inhabit them, and ecologies have a profound
inﬂuence on how we live. (Unlike the body, of course, environments diﬀer dramatically,
and landscapes oﬀer no private access to their inner workings; landscapes are also less
‘jointed’, so they may oﬀer greater opportunity for diverse ontologies).
A second point is that landscape (if understood to include the cityscapes in which half
of humanity now lives) provides the fundamental ‘Immobilien’ of our worlds1: it furnishes
us with large, (almost) immoveable entities and surfaces, with spatial and temporal con-
stancy and three-dimensional complexity on a large scale. The landscape presents itself
to the developing child as the backdrop for action, as a conceptual domain with its
own spatial properties – one conceives of oneself as necessarily inside it, with the attendant
puzzles of wayﬁnding and navigation (see Piaget and Inhelder, 1971). The Western mode
of navigation, based on turns to the left or right, is adapted to dense systems of existing
streets, roads and paths. Hunter–gatherers and others who live in less constructed land-
scapes tend to use non-egocentric systems of navigation, e.g., absolute abstract directions
like north, south, east and west (Majid et al., 2004). These contrastive cognitive styles are
reﬂected in language, which seems to play a causal role in inducing community-wide con-
sensus for one style over the other – some languages do not even have directional terms for
‘left’ and ‘right’ (Levinson, 2003). In both kinds of wayﬁnding, though, landmarks play a
crucial role – the essential Immobilien provided by our landscape cognition.1 The German term Immobilien for real estate captures some central properties of landscape features: their
immobility and scale.
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ogy? As always, one should let the language decide. Do the descriptive terms (‘hill’, ‘lake’,
‘river’ and the like) form a system, a set of contrastive terms, or a set that draws on shared
rules of formation, or a set whose structure is uniﬁed by an underlying set of semantic
parameters? Do the descriptive terms form a covert category, taking, e.g., special forms
of a locative, dative or ablative marker (cf. sea-wards), or zero-marking of location or
direction (cf. He went home)? For many languages (see the papers below), an argument
can certainly be made that lexical subsystems exist in this conceptual ﬁeld. Indeed, one
of the discoveries arising from this collection is that this is a conceptual ﬁeld where what
we dub semplates are quite pervasive – semplates are semantic templates that structure a
lexical set, often in covert ways (see Section 3.4 below).
If and when parts of the landscape domain function like semantic ﬁelds, they may do so
in diﬀerent ways. In principle there could be taxonomic (kind-of) relations between land-
scape terms, so that, e.g., a brook could be a small kind of stream, which could be a small
kind of river. Alternatively, the relation could be partonymic (or meronymic), so that Ber-
lin could be part of Brandenburg, or a park part of a city, or a bay part of the sea. In fact,
judging from the papers in this volume, neither of these hierarchical schemes seem prom-
inent in native conception or linguistic conceptualisation (with the partial exception of
area terms, which may have partonymic conceptualisations). Leaving aside area terms,
landscape terms for the most part seem to denote objects – very large, unmoveable objects,
Immobilien in fact. In many cultures, landscape objects can be bought, sold, inherited and
bequeathed in similar ways to chattels (Mobilien in German). But if landscape features are
treated by languages just like objects, why think there might be any special linguistic sci-
ence of landscape terms? One reason is that languages tend to treat landscape terms as sys-
tematically ambiguous between objects and places: in ‘The forest is huge’, the forest is an
object, in ‘The ruin is in the forest’, the forest becomes a place, with special semantic and
syntactic properties (Lyons, 1977, pp. 477ﬀ).2 In English (and other European languages),
one of the neat things that prepositions do is convert objects into places: if the table is an
object, on the table is a place, and these are quite diﬀerent ontological categories (Jackend-
oﬀ, 1983; Landau and Jackendoﬀ, 1993). Places can be freely introduced as locative
adjuncts (He sang on top of the mountain), and they provide the grounding for spatial
movement, freely collocating with special cases (e.g., Ablative, Allative) or spatial prepo-
sitions (into, onto, out of).
If places have a special ontology, landscape terms themselves make individual commit-
ments to speciﬁc landscape entities. ‘Mountain’, ‘cliﬀ’ and ‘river’ presume the existence of
such things – they seem real enough that one might reasonably consider universal concepts
here (Smith and Mark, 2001). But one of the central messages of this collection is that we
are in for a surprise – there are no direct equivalents for these terms in, e.g., the language
Ye´lıˆ Dnye described below. Cognitive geographers have recently come to the same conclu-
sions, calling for a systematic ‘ethnophysiography’ (Mark and Turk, 2003b, 2004).3 Since
the surface of the earth is objectively a continuous surface (especially if we exclude water
features), it can be segmented into quasi-objects in diﬀerent ways – for example we can2 Cf. Cablitz, 2008.
3 We should record our debt to David Mark, with whom we have been repeatedly in contact over the
development of this project.
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such a fold, or as the entire drainage area right up the ﬂanks, or do without any such con-
cept. A dried up water course (or wadi) may be thought of as a river, but it consists only of
the bottom and banks, which are perhaps not part of a river as English speakers think of it
(see Mark and Turk, 2003a).
The variation in the ontology of labelable landforms across languages, as displayed in
this volume, makes the point that landscape features do not come, for the most part, pre-
segmented by nature. What then does determine the recognition of speciﬁc landform types
as labelable entities in a language and culture? No one answer seems remotely adequate for
the data gathered here. Perceptual salience sometimes seems to play only a minor role,
while cultural and ecological preoccupations (e.g., subsistence pattern, symbolic signiﬁ-
cance, human aﬀordance and hindrance) seem to have more profound inﬂuences. In other
studies of human categorisation of the environment, for example in ethnobiology, there
have been lively discussions about whether the categories are driven by a natural human
intellectual interest or by utilitarian considerations (Berlin, 1992, versus Hunn, 1982, 1985;
see also Malt, 1995). In the landscape domain, however, one might expect utilitarian fac-
tors to have predominance. It is therefore interesting to ﬁnd a recurrent theme in the data
in this collection: landscape terms tend to be organised around an imposed cognitive
scheme or template, sometimes overt in the morphology, sometimes covert in the seman-
tics. We explain this further below, under the rubric of semplates.
These ontological puzzles might seem to be of only academic interest, but nothing
could be further from the truth. With the rise of geographic information systems and
global positioning systems playing a central role in navigation, resource management,
emergency services and the like, these ontological issues have come to have huge prac-
tical import. GoogleEarth, and its more sophisticated cousins, map place names all over
the world – but in so doing they map indigenous names to an imposed universal ontol-
ogy (of geographic entities like mountains, rivers, bays, etc. derived from an English con-
ceptualisation of landscape reality). The local inhabitants may have something
completely diﬀerent in mind (on Rossel Island, for example, no river corresponds to a
single name). When emergency aid is delivered, or a cruise missile for that matter, to
the GIS label, it may be way oﬀ target, because of the potential underlying ontological
mismatch.4
As this example makes clear, the Western tradition tends to think of place names as
mapping to the ontology set up by our landscape terms: Mount Rossel should denote a
mountain, Botany Bay should denote a bay, and The River Kwai should denote a river.
But, as the paper on Jahai in this collection makes absolutely clear, this need not be the
case: the terms for landscape features and the names for places can be hooked up to quite
distinct ontologies. Place names are the one part of this ﬁeld that have, of course, received
a lot of traditional linguistic attention. Most of this attention derives from their historical
interest, for place names are one of the most conservative elements in a language, surviving
even repeated language shift (like Vienna from Celtic Vindobona through Latin into Ger-
manic). They also form a universal, or near universal, linguistic category – and there are4 Moreover, current large-scale standardised mapping projects in developing countries may run counter to, and
endanger, indigenous practices.
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oﬀer. Obviously, landscape terms tend to denote common recurring features of the land-
scape, making descriptive phrases of the kind the red cliﬀs potentially ambiguous. Above
all, we have a great interest in the individuation of places, because that individuation
makes talk about wayﬁnding possible, and further allows us to individuate human groups
associated with places.
But utilitarian explanations of the importance of place names is partly beside the point,
for places have a centrality in our cognition by ancient phylogenetic inheritance: in the
midst of the vertebrate brain is an organ, the hippocampus, specialised in the memory
for places. Birds that cache food over winter have bigger hippocampi than those who
do not, and so do human taxi drivers over other city dwellers (Maguire et al., 2000). There
are single cells in the hippocampus specialised for the memory of individual places (see
Burgess et al., 1999). Moreover, there is a special brain system for distinguishing land-
marks (places useful for wayﬁnding) from other kinds of places (Janzen and van Turenn-
out, 2004). This specialised neural architecture was around millions of years before human
language, just waiting for linguistic exploitation when humans ﬁnally got their act together
and became language users. (Incidentally, the other major system of proper names, namely
personal names, is also hooked to a specialised and ancient brain area for the recognition
of individual conspeciﬁcs – see Enﬁeld and Stivers, 2007).
What this specialised cognitive architecture provides is more than just quick, dedicated
memory for places: it locates a place in a network of other places, for the hippocampus
provides a mental map of the environment (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). It is this mental
map that allows us to linguistically ‘zoom in’ and ‘zoom out’ – to vary the granularity
of place description (see Schegloﬀ, 1972). It is mental maps that give places their cognitive
importance as waypoints in navigation. Mental maps also give places their general reso-
nance in cognition, for example the art of memory is easily enhanced by hooking non-spa-
tial memoranda to a spatial scheme (Yates, 1966). This resonance has been frequently
noted in the anthropological record (see, e.g., Basso, 1996; Hercus et al., 2002; Levinson,
1996, etc.).
The intrinsic connection of places to other places, in a network forming a mental map,
is precisely what is missing from traditional onomastics (the linguistics of names).
Recently, Hunn (1996), Kari (1989) and others have suggested that place names deserve
an investigation of precisely this sort, asking why some places get named, others not,
why some cultures have dense systems of place names and others not, and whether the spe-
ciﬁc form of names (e.g., unanalysable versus transparent, uninomial versus binomial)
reﬂects diﬀering cognitive import. What the contents of this collection suggest, however,
is that to spur a real science of place names we need to understand the landform ontologies
that are often – though not always – deeply interconnected. We hope this special issue will
partly achieve this.
To sum up so far: landscape constitutes an important, and relatively neglected, domain
for linguistic exploration. It has deep cognitive underpinnings, and two major universal
linguistic manifestations: landform terms, and place names. The dominant presumption
has been that these two kinds of linguistic domain have universal, or near universal, onto-5 A possible exception is the village sign system Kata Kolok in Bali, which apparently lacks place names, using
an absolute pointing system instead (Ulrike Zeshan, personal communication). We know of no other such
reports.
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Turk (2003a) and the papers in this collection.
3. The cross-linguistic perspective
The present collection of articles is the outcome of collaborative work carried out
within the Space Project in the Language and Cognition Group at the Max Planck Insti-
tute for Psycholinguistics. Research has revolved around a set of questions ﬁrst formulated
in a questionnaire by Bohnemeyer (2001), later expanded by Bohnemeyer et al. (2004). Ini-
tially targeting the formal and functional properties of place names, the research agenda
was widened to also incorporate the linguistic categorisation of the physical environment,
as reﬂected in generic landscape terms. The general questions serving as guidelines for the
research can be summarised as follows:
1. How is landscape divided into categories, and how are these categories named? Are
there cross-linguistic diﬀerences in how landscape is divided into categories? Which
are the main determinants of landscape categorisation?
2. How do we formally identify place names? What places are place names employed to
refer to? How are places semantically construed for this purpose?
3. What is the denotational relation between landscape terms and place names?
Each contribution represents a detailed account of one or more of these issues in the
context of a particular language (typically in traditional small-scale societies), written by
one or more experts on the language in question and based on data from ﬁrst-hand ﬁeld-
work. There are nine such contributions, representing a range of genetically, typologically
and geographically diverse languages: Brown’s on Tzeltal (Mayan, Mesoamerica),
Burenhult’s on Jahai (Mon-Khmer, Malay Peninsula), Cablitz’s on Marquesan (Austrone-
sian, Polynesia), Enﬁeld’s (2008) on Lao (Tai, Mainland Southeast Asia), Levinson’s
(2008) on Ye´lıˆ Dnye (isolate, Island Melanesia), O’Connor and Kroefges’s (2008) on Low-
land Chontal (isolate, Mesoamerica), O’Meara and Bohnemeyer’s on Seri (isolate, Meso-
america), Senft’s on Kilivila (Austronesian, Island Melanesia), and Widlok’s on 6¼Akhoe
Hai//om (Khoisan, southwestern Africa) (see Fig. 1).
Even in this small sample of languages, the cross-linguistic approach allows for a com-
parison of landscape terms and place names in (a) similar and diﬀerent ecologies and (b)
similar and diﬀerent subsistence systems. For example, we are in a position to compare the
categorial systems of unrelated languages in similar as well as varying ecologies. Also, we
can compare systems used in similar subsistence situations but in unrelated languages and
vastly diﬀerent environments (see Sections 3.1, 3.2).
The comparison oﬀers interesting insights into ontological diversity as well as con-
straints, and Sections 3.1–3.6 outline the most signiﬁcant generalisations to be made from
the present work.
3.1. Carving out categories: cross-linguistic diversity
Our language sample provides evidence of considerable cross-linguistic variation in
terms of the denotational properties of landscape terms. Convex geomorphic features
are one case in point. Comparing those terms for which the English gloss ‘mountain’ is
Fig. 1. Languages represented in this special issue.
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size, being applicable to features of varying magnitude (mountains, hills and even crab
mounds on the beach), and only encodes that the feature has a conical shape. Similar
non-speciﬁcity as to size is reported for Lowland Chontal ijwala’, although this term is
applicable only to real geomorphic features and not anthills, for example. Tzeltal witz sim-
ilarly translates as both ‘mountain’ and ‘hill’, as does Kilivila koya. On the other hand,
several mountain terms in Marquesan are all described as denoting large-scale convex fea-
tures and categorising according to shape or location of the feature. Seri hast com is
deﬁned by its ‘substance’ (stone) and posture (lying). Lao phuu2, ﬁnally, is translated as
‘mountainous terrain’. While this term encodes elevated landmass, it does not refer to a
conical or similar unit.
When we turn to concave geomorphic features, it is interesting to note that a category
corresponding to English ‘valley’ is not universally present in our sample. Kilivila, Low-
land Chontal and Tzeltal are described as having a valley term comparable to that of Eng-
lish. The Marquesan term for valley is the same as that for river and village. Lao and Ye´lıˆ
Dnye lack a valley term, the closest equivalent terms meaning things like ‘gradient’ or ‘bot-
tom of inclined plane’. This absence of terminology cannot be explained by an absence of
the landscape feature in question: both these languages are certainly spoken in environ-
ments containing features which would be referred to as valleys in English.
Running water is another example. Terms glossed as ‘river’ diﬀer considerably as to
what they denote. Some languages make no lexical distinction between water as a sub-
stance and water as a landscape feature (cf. Jahai). Some languages make a distinction
based on size, Tzeltal and (to some extent) Lao being cases in point; others less so, like
Lowland Chontal and Seri. Ye´lıˆ Dnye segments running water into three distinct portions
of a drainage system, two of which make up what would normally be translated as ‘river’
and one which falls outside the denotation of the English term (the ﬂow of river water
across a lagoon, between the river mouth and the reef opening). 6¼Akhoe Hai//om makes
no distinction between permanent watercourses and dry riverbeds which only sporadically
contain running water.
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similar also reveals marked diﬀerences. Kilivila and Ye´lıˆ Dnye are unrelated but both
spoken in similar marine ecologies in Island Melanesia. Both have rich sets of marine
vocabulary denoting parts of the sea, based on the contour of the ocean ﬂoor between
the beach and the deep sea outside the reef. Yet they segment this part of the environ-
ment in diﬀerent ways (see the comparison made in Levinson’s contribution; see also
Senft, 2008).
Clearly, languages can diﬀer considerably in the denotational properties of landscape
terms, even for seemingly easily translatable terms. Diﬀerent languages segment and out-
line landforms in diﬀerent ways: while Ye´lıˆ Dnye mbu, Lowland Chontal ijwala’, Lao
phuu2 and English mountain may all be used to refer to the same instance of raised sloping
landmass, careful investigation of their extensional range reveals variation in semantic
content. The ‘valley’ example also shows that features which might be thought of as obvi-
ous candidates for labelling need not ﬁnd lexical expression in all languages. Here our
results parallel those of Mark and Turk (2003a, 2004).
3.2. Driving forces of categorisation
Some contributions address the question of what it is that causes a language to catego-
rise and label the geographical environment in a certain way. Three main hypotheses of
category formation have here served as starting points: (1) the independent salience of fea-
tures, (2) the interactional properties of features, especially their utilitarian signiﬁcance to
the speech community, and (3) cultural and linguistic models present in the speech com-
munity (outlined further in Section 3.4).
Brown and Levinson, describing Tzeltal and Ye´lıˆ Dnye respectively, suggest that all
three types of category formation come into play, although not in equal doses. Ye´lıˆ
Dnye, for example, is described as relying mainly on a cultural model, as well as utilitar-
ian properties relating to subsistence and transport, but less on perceptual salience.
Burenhult, describing Jahai hydrological terminology, argues that distinct systems of
lexical categorisation can have diﬀerent motivation. For example, one labelling system
can pick out perceptually and interactionally salient features, whereas another system
systematically avoids such features. In Seri, as described by O’Meara and Bohnemeyer,
landscape categorisation is strongly determined by the tools provided by the structure of
the language. Enﬁeld’s account of Lao focuses speciﬁcally on this issue: he argues
that lexical categorisation at large cannot be directly explained by the natural or utilitar-
ian salience of entities, but must be understood through the utility of words in
conversation.
When we compare individual languages, it is clear that ecology is not a reliable pre-
dictor of how categorisations are made, as shown by the comparison of Kilivila and
Ye´lıˆ Dnye seascape terminology (see Section 3.1 and Levinson, 2008). In this case, inde-
pendent salience of features does not help to produce the same categorial output in dif-
ferent languages. Similarly, the general subsistence system of a speech community is not
necessarily a good indicator of the types of categorisations made in language. The three
languages of our sample which are spoken in hunter–gatherer communities – 6¼Akhoe
Hai//om, Jahai and Seri – show no evidence of sharing categorial strategies distinct
from those of the other languages. On the contrary, any similarities tend to cross-cut
the diﬀerent modes of subsistence. For example, reliance on the body metaphor is a cat-
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tence equals. The closest equivalent of the Seri strategy of categorisation is found in
Lowland Chontal, spoken by an agricultural and trading community. In these cases,
similar styles of interaction with landscape fail to produce similar categorisation in
diﬀerent languages. (Rather, the similarities between Seri and Lowland Chontal
suggest that the typological characteristics of the language can be a signiﬁcant factor
in categorisation, although there is little further support for this in the rest of our
sample.)
Clearly, however, the proposed driving forces of landscape categorisation are diﬃcult
to tease apart. Perceptual salience can be an interactional property; utilitarian signiﬁcance
is itself a manifestation of culture; cultural and linguistic models are likely to have utilitar-
ian motivation or rewards, and they can set out from perceptually salient features (be it
inside or outside the domain of landscape itself); and so on. Perhaps it is not so much a
question of which driving force of categorisation is the most relevant one, but instead
how the forces interact and from what levels of representation they operate.
3.3. Landscape as a semantic domain
Is landscape a cross-linguistically distinct and easily identiﬁable domain? European
cultures identify categories like ‘landscape’ and ‘geography’, but are these to be treated
on a par with reasonably well-established semantic domains like kinship, colour, anatomy
and biology? Despite the points raised earlier about the neurocognitive basis and general
linguistic ontology of places, our cross-cultural sample suggests there is reason to be cau-
tious about the integrity of landscape, at least as far as generic terms are concerned.
Unique beginner terms for landscape as a whole are not in much evidence, and no
domain-encompassing systems of lexical relations are reported. Brown, for example, pro-
poses the existence of a ‘physical environment’ domain in Tzeltal on the basis of struc-
tural evidence of object properties but shows that terms for such objects do not enter
into lexical relations with each other and are not subsumed under an overarching land-
scape label.
Other contributions emphasise the inseparability of landscape from other domains. In
his account of 6¼Akhoe Hai//om, Widlok tells of how notions of landscape are initimately
intertwined with notions of settlement, migration, resources and ethnicity, suggesting that
landscape is indeed an artiﬁcial domain. Cablitz’s account of Marquesan suggests that
landscape features are not straightforwardly separable from atmospheric and celestial fea-
tures. Moreover, Burenhult’s contribution on Jahai suggests that mapping of the physical
environment can be secondary in the sense that it largely draws on other domains, thereby
ruling out landscape as itself representing a distinct and basic domain.
This reinforces the picture of the physical environment as being a setting or scene onto
which linguistic categorisation can operate in a multitude of ways, both within and across
languages. It is less of an independent backdrop in the form of a discrete and self-standing
categorial system (again, see Widlok, 2008). Arguably, landscape is therefore qualitatively
very diﬀerent from semantic domains like kinship, anatomy and life forms. Indeed, such
domains are sometimes employed to map landscape, among other things. However, lexical
subsystems of a diﬀerent sort do seem to make landscape their major locus operandi, as
will be shown in the following section, and these systems suggest that landscape may form
a coherent domain in at least some languages.
144 N. Burenhult, S.C. Levinson / Language Sciences 30 (2008) 135–1503.4. Language and culture shape the land: leitmotifs and semplates
A signiﬁcant ﬁnding emerging from the work presented in this special issue is that the
geographical environment can lend itself to categorisation according to prefabricated cul-
tural or linguistic systems. Several accounts report a ‘design principle’ (O’Meara and
Bohnemeyer, 2008), ‘template’, ‘model’, ‘schema’ or ‘frame’ (Brown, 2008; Burenhult,
2008; Cablitz, 2008; Levinson, 2008), which helps to organise the landscape domain cate-
gorically. Speciﬁcally, cultural themes or linguistic patterns are imposed on the environ-
ment to create, co-ordinate, subcategorise, or contrast landscape categories.6
Such systems vary in how they surface linguistically and are not always easy to discern.
For example, the lexical instantiations of the ‘up/down/across’ model described for Ye´lıˆ
Dnye provide few clues as to wider semantic relations, yet underlyingly there is a consis-
tent pattern of oppositions which pervades much of the landscape-related terminology as
well as place-naming.7
Lexically more overt systems are those employing metaphor to map landscape features
(see especially the accounts of Jahai, Marquesan and Tzeltal). Such systems draw on
source domains like body and kinship to create partonymic and taxonomic relationships
within and between landscape categories, sometimes abstracting away from the individual
features themselves to a point where the semantic content of labels becomes restricted to a
minimum (see Burenhult’s contribution). So, while the system is lexically instantiated and
thus easy to identify and characterise linguistically, its exact denotational relationship to
the landscape features it labels is harder to pin down. Importantly, such mapping systems
rooted in domains outside landscape can be pervasive in mapping the physical domain as a
whole, not just geographical features.
The typological design principle proposed by O’Meara and Bohnemeyer for Seri exem-
pliﬁes yet another type of system. Here, an overarching typological feature of the language
provides the tools for landscape categorisation, eﬀectively creating objects from a basic set
of ‘elements’ (seawater, freshwater, stone, and land) according to a pattern common to the
whole nominal lexicon. A similar interpretation is given to Lowland Chontal by O’Connor
and Kroefges, but with the added notion of basic materials like water and earth (described
as ‘primary forces of nature’) as agents, doers or causers of landscape, as reﬂected in a
large portion of the landscape lexicon.
Another possible example of such a cultural template is the salient inside–outside
dichotomy described by Cablitz for parts of the Marquesan system of categorisation.
As is evident, these ontological systems set out from diﬀerent conceptual baselines, or
leitmotifs. Motion drives the model in Ye´lıˆ Dnye; part and size (and ultimately animacy)
are the dimensions expressed by the metaphorical templates in Jahai, Marquesan and Tzel-
tal; agency shapes the system in Lowland Chontal; substance forms the running theme in
Seri; and containment catches the essence of the Marquesan example. One can imagine
other such fundamental themes, not found in the present sample. Furthermore, languages
can make use of more than one leitmotif, as shown by Jahai and Marquesan, where sep-
arate templates of motion, part and size, and part and containment, respectively, provide
alternative ontologies.6 For similar phenomena reported elsewhere, see e.g. Bennardo, 2002, 2005; Gell, 1995; Gow, 1995; Wazir-
Jahan, 1980.
7 Cf. Whorf’s so-called cryptotypes (Whorf, 1945, 1964).
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lexical expression, the various systems are similar in that all represent semantic generali-
sations which do not restrict themselves to single semantic domains or ﬁelds. Together
they form a level of representation which does not ﬁnd any clear equivalent in existing
semantic theory, and we here propose the term ‘semplates’ (a blend of ‘semantic tem-
plates’) as a generic label for them. Arguably, such semplates are potentially signiﬁcant
as engines in the structuring of native conception and lexicon.
Semplates have interesting connections to the ‘cultural models’ of psychological anthro-
pology (Holland and Quinn, 1987; D’Andrade and Strauss, 1994). Cultural models are
culturally formed cognitive schemas which determine how human reality is constructed
and interpreted in thought and action. Semplates would seem to represent a linguistic
counterpart of such models and may indeed be linguistic manifestations of them, at least
in some cases. The exact relationship between semplates and cultural models promises to
be an interesting area for future research. But a more immediate (and prerequisite) future
concern for linguists is to explore and establish more ﬁrmly the characteristics and role of
semplates in language, both in landscape and elsewhere.
3.5. Naming principles: how to generate place names
In our sample, the linguistic characteristics of place names vary in the following dimen-
sions: degree of semantic analysability, morphological complexity, syntactic identity, and
the lexical source domains from which names are drawn (including reliance on landscape
terms).
In the absence of etymology, the semantic analysis of place names is fraught with dan-
ger. Consultants’ explanations of the meaning of names are, at least in non-straightfor-
ward cases, highly likely to be folk etymologies having little to do with historical
reality. Such folk etymologies can represent conventions upheld by the whole speech com-
munity, or they can be made up on the spot. While of considerable interest in their own
right, they are not necessarily very informative about the strategies once used to create
the names. It is therefore important, although not always easy, to maintain a distinction
between names which are semantically analysable and those which are not. Contributions
to this special issue diﬀer in their reporting as to the extent of such analysability. While the
accounts of Lowland Chontal and Marquesan tell of a high degree of semantic transpar-
ency in place names, those of 6¼Akhoe Hai//om, Jahai, Kilivila, Tzeltal, and Ye´lıˆ Dnye
suggest a more or less substantial component of semantically opaque names (for which
there may nevertheless be elaborate folk etymologies, cf. Jahai and Kilivila). Possibly, such
diﬀerences in degree of analysability have historical roots, reﬂecting for example varying
antiquity of a language in its region (long linguistic continuity being associated with archa-
isms in place names), or diﬀerences in willingness to adopt place names of previous linguis-
tic strata or borrow them from neighbouring languages.
The languages also diﬀer somewhat as to the degree of morphological complexity in
place names. Jahai is radical in having almost only simplex (monomorphemic) forms,
Lowland Chontal shows a preference for complex (binomial) forms, and Kilivila, Marque-
san, Tzeltal, and Ye´lıˆ Dnye display a mix of forms. This relates to which syntactic units a
language allows itself to use as place names. While Jahai place names, to the extent that
they are semantically transparent, are typically bare nouns (e.g., ‘Axe’, ‘Cartridge’,
‘Eagle’), many place names in 6¼Akhoe Hai//om, Kilivila, Lowland Chontal, Marquesan
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otherwise modiﬁed nouns (‘Mad People’, ‘Diﬃcult Point’, ‘Big Mouth’). Marquesan
names are frequently nouns with a deﬁnite article (‘The Coconut’, ‘The Forehead’). Kiliv-
ila and Marquesan have examples of place names in the form of adpositional phrases
(‘Towards the Almond Tree’, ‘Above the Bird’). Occasionally, place names are represented
by whole clauses or exclamations.
Most of the languages show great internal variation with respect to the lexical source
domains from which place name components are drawn. Terms representing landscape
features, body parts, animals, plants, objects, people, proper names, properties, and activ-
ities all feature more or less prominently. Of particular interest to us, however, is that lan-
guages appear to diﬀer considerably as to the extent to which they make use of landscape
terms in creating place names. Jahai and Ye´lıˆ Dnye represent extremes in this regard, the
latter making frequent use of them, the former not at all. An example of a distinction
within the class of landscape terms is provided by Lowland Chontal, where place-naming
frequently involves landscape terms denoting geographic objects but never terms derived
from the words denoting the substances of water and earth.
A mythical and/or commemorative dimension is evident in many of the systems
described, see especially the accounts of Jahai, Kilivila, Lowland Chontal, Marquesan
and Tzeltal.
3.6. What gets named?
The denotational properties of place names point to interesting cross-cultural diﬀer-
ences in how place names form systems and how such systems are anchored in the land-
scape. One potentially signiﬁcant distinction to explore is that between feature names and
area names. We deﬁne feature names as place names which individuate and denote iden-
tiﬁable features of concrete geography, such as landforms (mountains, rivers, caves etc.,
e.g., Snowdon, Rhine), human-made entities (settlements, roads, garden plots, bridges,
etc., e.g., Amsterdam, The Appalachian Trail, Golden Gate), and biological entities (stands
of vegetation, individual trees, animal dwellings etc., e.g., Major Oak in Sherwood Forest
and The Senate, a group of giant sequoias in Sequoia National Park, California). Feature
names have the potential to pick out a whole range of divergent aspects of the natural and
constructed environment and name them in close symbiosis with generic linguistic catego-
ries referring to concrete geographic features, such as landscape terms, but they are unable
to provide total coverage of the environment. Area names, on the other hand, can be
deﬁned as place names which individuate and denote regions not naturally given by con-
crete geography, such as units or tracts of land deﬁned by ownership, usage rights, polit-
ical/administrative inﬂuence, ethnicity, kinship, history, myth, or other conceptual
associations (e.g., Soho, Orange County, Languedoc). Area names have the potential to
totally cover the environment in a patchwork of named units, but cannot distinguish indi-
vidual concrete features and consequently do not have co-referential relationships with
generic linguistic categories referring to such features. Area names may well form overlap-
ping sets, with or without common boundaries.88 Incidentally, as will be shown below, these diﬀerences between feature names and area names hold even
though area names may often be drawn metonymically from feature names.
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and area names, it is interesting to note cross-linguistic diﬀerences in the balance between
the two. In our sample, Ye´lıˆ Dnye stands out as making the most systematic use of both
strategies (much like what could be claimed for European languages). A mix of systems is
evident also in Tzeltal; here feature-naming has a connection to indigenous names, while
some area names (of an administrative nature) are frequently forms borrowed from colo-
nial Spanish. Kilivila, Marquesan and Lowland Chontal all seem to have a clear bias
towards feature names. 6¼Akhoe Hai//om provides examples of what would seem to be
a ﬂexible system of feature names which are productively ‘stretched’ according to need
to become area names. 6¼Akhoe Hai//om also has names for larger regions which are
based on dominating landscape features but which abstract away from those features,
associate with activity and ethnicity, and, in eﬀect, become area names. Jahai, ﬁnally,
can be argued to systematically use only area names. While anchored in drainage, Jahai
place names operate independently of generically labelled landscape categories and eﬀec-
tively cover the territory in named units. However, the papers in this collection do not
claim to include an exhaustive (or even a truly representative) sample of place names
for each language, so conclusions here can only be tentative.
Looking at the relationship between what is named and how it is named, we ﬁnd that
feature names predictably often include the generic terms for the feature in question and
are then descriptive in character (e.g., Marquesan ‘Birds’ Island’, Tzeltal ‘Treemoss Moun-
tain’, Ye´lıˆ Dnye ‘Snake Passage’). Area names are less inclined to draw on such feature
terms; Jahai names, for example, never consist of or include generic terms referring to local
features. But there are exceptions: features can give their names to whole areas, as in the
case of 6¼Akhoe Hai//om. This is a strategy which is also found in Lowland Chontal and
Tzeltal (e.g., three peaks giving the name ‘Three Mountains’ to a whole traditional area).
Conversely, Kilivila names show a very close association denotationally with landscape
features but seldom include the generic terms for those features.
Another dimension worthy of further investigation is the role of hierarchy in place-
naming (cf. Basso, 1984). Can referents of named places be described as being organised
into neat partonymies, with smaller entities nestled in larger ones? And are there restric-
tions as to the number of levels? Again, the distinction between feature names and area
names may be helpful in outlining the various possibilities available. Feature names have
the potential to form hierarchies with other feature names (say, for example, rock X as
part of mountain Y), and area names with other area names (e.g., the two-level system
proposed for Jahai). But feature names may also subcategorise under area names (the
overlapping systems in Ye´lıˆ Dnye may be a case in point), and area names can potentially
refer to parts of a larger entity associated with a feature name (e.g., individually named
conceptual units on the slopes of a named mountain). Are there languages which avoid
hierarchy altogether, preferring instead to organise named places into associative networks
based on, e.g., spatial proximity or contiguity, or more abstract associations (myth, kin-
ship, etc.)? Some aspects of the system described for 6¼Akhoe Hai//om are reminiscent
of this. And are there languages which simply do not bother to organise place names at
all in relation to each other? In the absence of structural evidence, these issues are diﬃcult
to untangle, and the cross-linguistic tendencies are therefore still unclear.
A related issue is how named places are crossed with generic categories to yield speciﬁc
reference. For example, can referents of place names be productively subcategorised by
means of spatial relator expressions like ‘top’, ‘side’ and ‘bottom’, as in Tzeltal? Or by
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that place names combine productively with, e.g., landscape terms to create unique refer-
ence. This is a strategy employed consistently in Jahai by means of associative phrases, and
with possessive constructions in Tzeltal for reference to rivers and trails.4. Conclusion
The contributions to this special issue explore the linguistic categories of landscape
terms and place names in a range of diverse languages. While these two kinds of categories
are universal (or near universal), the data presented here provides evidence of considerable
variation within and across languages in how each of them is ontologised. Systems vary as
to how categories are carved out and what it is that drives this categorisation, how place
names are generated and what entities receive such names. Landscape, it turns out, does
not automatically give you an ontology – there is a great deal of plasticity in how language
models the earth and in what is considered to be the essence of its features. Capturing
landscape ontology cross-culturally is about understanding this variation, identifying lim-
its to it, and exploring the balance within and across languages. The variation in underly-
ing ontology is a matter of great practical importance, as understanding the correct
reference of landscape terms and place names is essential to many major areas of human
joint endeavour, from mapping to international law. We also hope to have shown that
landscape is a linguistic domain of considerable interest in its own right and one that pro-
vokes questions of general signiﬁcance to language science.Acknowledgements
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